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The Louisiana Constitution of 1974 grants appellate courts the
power to review facts as well as law,1 while common law courts are
limited in their appellate review of questions of fact. This distinc-
tion, however, is elusive. In a common law jury trial, if reasonable
minds could not conclude from the evidence the existence of facts
necessary to support a verdict, the trial judge commits an error of
law if he permits the verdict to stand; his decision, and thus the
jury's determination of fact, is subject to appellate review disguised
as a question of law. In non-jury cases, decisions on questions of fact
may be reversed if they are "clearly erroneous." Thus, although ap-
pellate review at common law is described as being limited to ques-
tions of law, in reality there is limited review of questions of fact.
By a like token, Louisiana appellate courts do not make unlimited
review of questions of fact.2 Although the Louisiana constitutional
provision' could support a de novo determination of fact questions
on appeal, the Louisiana Supreme Court has imposed the restriction
that an appellate court should not reverse on questions of fact
unless the decision below was "manifestly erroneous."' The supreme
court also has interpreted the language of Civil Code article 1934(3)
as imposing the restriction that an award of general damages should
not be modified unless the trial court has abused the "much discre-
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. LA. CONST. art. V, § 5(c) provides that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by this
constitution, the jurisdiction of the supreme court in civil cases extends to both law
and facts." LA. CONST. art. V, § 10(b) states, in pertinent part, that the "appellate
jurisdiction of a court of appeal extends to law and facts."
2. See Comment, Appellate Review of Facts in Louisiana Civil Cases, 21 LA. L.
REV. 402 (1961).
3. See note 1, supra.
4. "[A] judgment of the trial court on questions of fact will not be disturbed on
appeal unless manifestly erroneous." Succession of Fields, 222 La. 310, 319, 62 So. 2d
495, 498 (1952). See The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1946-1947
Term-Civil Procedure, 8 LA. L. REV. 261 (1948); Comment, supra note 2, at 402-03.
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
tion" granted to the judge and jury.' So engrained into Louisiana
law are these "manifest error" and "much discretion" standards that
it may be argued that they were incorporated into those provisions
of the 1974 constitution continuing appellate review of fact. This
issue probably will not arise, however, since the supreme court and
the intermediate appellate courts consistently have acknowledged
the viability of both rules.'
The application of the two rules, however, has been fraught with
turmoil, much of which has surfaced in the past few years. The
following test for "manifest error" was summarized by the supreme
court in 1973 through Justice Tate in Canter v. Koehring Co.:
When there is evidence before the trier of fact which, upon
its reasonable evaluation of credibility, furnishes a reasonable
factual basis for the trial court's finding, on review the appellate
court should not disturb this factual finding in the absence of
manifest error. Stated another way, the reviewing court must
give great weight to factual conclusions of the trier of fact;
where there is conflict in the testimony, reasonable evaluations
of credibility and reasonable inferences of fact should not be dis-
turbed upon review, even though the appellate court may feel
that its own evaluations and inferences are as reasonable.7
By 1978 the supreme court perceived that the appellate courts
were overlooking the language of the Canter test emphasized above;
review was limited to a determination of whether there was evi-
dence in the record from which reasonable minds could have found
as the trial court did. This limited application of the "manifest
error" rule is arguably an abdication of the constitutional charge to
review facts, since it merely provides the same review of facts as in
common law courts, where review is theoretically more narrow.
It was in this atmosphere that the court, during the 1978-79
5. See, e.g., Temple v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 330 So. 2d 891 (La. 1976); Gonzales
v. Xerox Corp., 320 So. 2d 163 (La. 1975); Anderson v. Welding Testing Lab., Inc., 304
So. 2d 351 (La. 1974); Bitoun v. Landry, 302 So. 2d. 278 (La. 1974); Boutte v. Hargrove,
290 So. 2d 319 (La. 1974); Canter v. Koehring Co., 283 So. 2d 716 (La. 1973); Miller v.
Thomas, 258 La. 285, 246 So. 2d 16 (1971); Lomenick v. Schoeffler, 250 La. 959, 200 So.
2d 127 (1967); Ballard v. National Indem. Co., 246 La. 963, 169 So. 2d 64 (1964); Gaspard
v. LeMaire, 245 La. 239, 158 So. 2d 149 (1963).
6. See, e.g., Canter v. Koehring Co., 283 So. 2d 716 (La. 1973); Andrews v.
Williams, 281 So. 2d 120 (La. 1973); Town of Slidell v. Temple, 246 La. 137, 164 So. 2d
276 (1964); Rhodes v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 195 La. 842, 197 So. 575 (1940); State Dep't of
Highways v. Moity, 276 So. 2d 770 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1973); Sunseri v. Sunseri, 256 So.
2d 673 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1972); Norman v. State, 69 So. 2d 120 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1953),
rev'd on other grounds, 227 La. 901, 80 So. 2d 858 (1955).
7. 283 So. 2d 716, 724 (La. 1973) (emphasis added).
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term, handed down its decision in Arceneaux v. Domingue.8 Justice
Dixon, writing for the majority, noted an apparent "widespread mis-
understanding of the holding of Canter."9 He then propounded the
majority's determination that "appellate review of facts is not com-
pleted by reading so much of the record as will reveal a reasonable
factual basis for the finding of the trial court; there must be a fur-
ther determination that the record establishes that the finding is
not clearly wrong (manifestly erroneous)."'0
This pronouncement in Arceneaux was adopted without dissent
in Young v. Clement." In another decision handed down on the same
day, Justice Tate reaffirmed the "clearly wrong" standard in an
offhanded fashion, concluding that
[O]n appellate review, the trial court's factual findings of
work-connected disability are entitled to great weight. They
should not be disturbed where there is evidence before the trier
of fact which, upon the latter's reasonable evaluation of
credibility, furnishes a reasonable factual basis for the trial
court's findings, unless clearly wrong.2
By the end of the term, it appeared that Arceneaux had replaced
Canter as the standard for appellate review; appellate decisions
which had routinely cited the latter now cited the former.
Citing Arceneaux is one thing, but applying it is another. One
may forcefully argue that no decision which reasonable minds could
reach can be "clearly wrong." There is precedent for the distinction,
however. The general common law and federal standard for appel-
late review in non-jury cases requires the appellate court to deter-
mine whether the judge's findings of fact were "clearly
erroneous."'" The test for such a determination is that "[a] finding is
'clearly erroneous' when although there is evidence to support it,
the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with a definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been committed."" A finding will
be found to be clearly erroneous if (1) it is not supported by sub-
stantial evidence, or (2) although supported by substantial evidence,
the findings are against the clear weight of the evidence, or (3) "the
appellate court otherwise reaches a definite and firm conviction that
a mistake has been made."'"
8. 365 So. 2d 1330 (La. 1978).
9. Id. at 1333.
10. Id.
11. 367 So. 2d 828, 829 (La. 1979).
12. Crump v. Hartford Accident and Indem. Co., 367 So. 2d 300, 301 (La. 1979).
13. See FED. R. Civ. P. 52.
14. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948).
15. 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2585 (1971).
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Several rationales may be suggested for the court's stance in
Arceneaux. The academic approach is that Arcenaux reflects an
attempt to resurrect the distinction between Louisiana and common
law appellate review. If a Louisiana appellate court limits its review
to a determination as to whether there is evidence from which
reasonable minds could have arrived at the same conclusion as the
trial court, the review is no broader than common law review of a
jury's fact finding, and the constitutional provision becomes mean-
ingless. The court stops short of de novo fact review, however,
because such unlimited review is both time consuming to the appel-
late court and demoralizing to the trial court."6
The tension between the supreme court and the appellate courts
over the scope of appellate review of fact also has spread to the
"much discretion"" rule applying to appeals of awards of general
damages. The general test, enunciated in Coco v. Winston In-
dustries, Inc.,18 states that
before a Court of Appeal can disturb an award made by a trial
court . . . the record must clearly reveal that the trier of fact
abused its discretion in making its award. Only after making...
[such a finding] can the appellate court disturb the award, and
then only to the extent of lowering it (or raising it) to the
highest (or lowest) point which is reasonably within the discre-
tion afforded that court.9
In Coco the supreme court appeared troubled that the appellate
courts were either substituting their own judgment for that of the
trier of fact" or placing too much emphasis on awards in similar
reported cases, 2' or both. Coco warned the appellate judges of these
evils.22
In the waning weeks of the last term, the supreme court, in
Reck v. Stevens,2' again chastised the intermediate appellate courts
.16. Prior to Arceneaux, the potential problems of de novo fact review were
recognized as constraining the appellate tribunal to give no weight to the determina-
tion of the trial judge. Comment, supra note 2, at 412.
17. See note 5, supra, and accompanying text.
18. 341 So. 2d 332 (La. 1977).
19. Id. at 335 (citations omitted).
20. d.
21. Justice Calogero, writing for the majority, stated that "heretofore, courts of
appeal have placed too much emphasis on their review of other reported decisions ....
[N]o two cases are ever fully alike." Id.
22. The court's opinion noted that "lilt is never appropriate for a Court of Appeal,
having found that the trial court has abused its discretion, simply to decide what it
considers an appropriate award on the basis of the evidence." Id.
23. 373 So. 2d 498 (La. 1979).
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for their method of review of general damage awards. Apparently
convinced that the courts of appeal, despite the warning of Coco,
were placing too great an emphasis upon prior awards, 4 the court
strongly stressed that proper appellate review demands a careful
study of the particular circumstances surrounding the injury.
Justice Tate, as the organ of the court, indicated that the initial in-
quiry must always be directed to whether the particular effects of
the particular injuries of the particular plaintiff before the court are
such that there has been a clear abuse of the trier of fact's very
"great discretion."25 An award may be considered as excessive or in-
adequate only after an articulated analysis of the facts of the par-
ticular case discloses abuse.' Justice Tate emphasized that, in this
initial determination of abuse of discretion, prior awards should play
a limited role;" they may be considered as an aid to determine an
abuse of discretion only in those cases in which, on an articulated
basis, the award made by the lower court is shown to be greatly
disproportionate to all past awards for truly "similar" injuries. 8 He
then noted that, after finding an abuse of discretion, the appellate
courts may use prior awards for the purpose of fixing a proper
award in the case before the court. 9
While predicting a judge's legal philosophy is an inaccurate art,
attempting to synthesize a court's objective from a few decisions is
foolhardy. With that caveat, the writer perceives the following
message from the supreme court's most recent decisions on ap-
pellate review: the role of the supreme court is to decide questions
of law; the role of the appellate courts is primarily to assure that
the facts have been found properly, and the law applied to those
facts, in the trial court. However, in many cases the trial judge does
not prepare written reasons and the appellate court may affirm in a
written opinion which reflects only that (1) it has read enough of the
record to determine that there is evidence to support the findings of
fact, and (2) the award of damages falls within the "ballpark"
24. Id. at 500-01.
25. Id. at 501 n.3.
26. He wrote that "[o]nly after analysis of the facts and circumstances peculiar to
[a] . . .case . . .may a reviewing court determine that the award is excessive." Id
27.
In the initial determination of excessiveness or insufficiency, an examination of
prior awards has a limited function-if indeed the facts and circumstances of the
prior awards are closely similar to the present. The prior awards may serve as an
aid in this determination only where, on an articulated basis, the present award is
shown to be greatly disproportionate to past awards (not selected past awards,




established by awards in other cases. In such cases, the high court
cannot comfortably assume that the facts have properly been found
and the law correctly applied without making its own painstaking
review of the whole record. The supreme court, with neither the
resources nor the inclination to make such a review, may simply be
informing the courts of appeal that their job is to make a thorough
review and to articulate reasons which will satisfy the supreme
court that the job has been done.
Another issue which frequently has arisen is whether the
"manifest error" rule should apply in cases in which credibility is
not an issue, or in which the trial judge did not observe the
witnesses while they were testifying." Since the rule is based in
part upon the premise that the trial court enjoys the superior van-
tage point in determining credibility of witnesses, 1 the argument
has been advanced that the rule is inapplicable to cases tried on
stipulations of fact, or other cases in which for some reason the
judge does not view the testimony of the witnesses.2 The argument
gains added support drawn from the supreme court's observation in
Walker v. Union Oil Mill, Inc.3 that "[slince the trial judge who
decided the case was not the same judge who tried the case, the
manifest error rule is not applicable.""'
The circuits are split on the perplexing issue whether "the mere
denial of a jury trial, without more ... result[s] in irreparable injury
such that it warrants a separate appeal."" Some courts have taken
the position that the denial of a jury trial cannot result in ir-
30. See, e.g., Succession of Fields, 22 La. 309, 319-20, 62 So. 2d 495, 498 (1952);
Jordan v. Jordan, 175 La. 468, 474-75, 143 So. 377, 378 (1932).
31. There is some indication that the rule originated only with regard to credibility
questions. See Carlisle v. Steamer Eudora, 5 La. Ann. 15 (1850); Jordan v. White, 4
Mart. (N.S.) 626 (La. 1826); Boissier's Syndics v. Belair, 3 Mart. (N.S.) 29 (La. 1824). But
see Shaw v. Canter, 8 Mart. (N.S.) 689 (La. 1830); Walton v. Grant, 2 Mart. (N.S.) 494
(La. 1824).
32. Cases lending support to the proposition that the manifest error rule is appli-
cable only in credibility matters (through stating the reason for the rule as being
that the trial judge sees and hears the witnesses and thus is in a better position
to determine credibility questions) include Diez v. Diez, 219 La. 575, 53 So. 2d 677
(1951); Trascher v. Ducote, 178 La. 925, 152 So. 567 (1934); Guillory v. Fontenot,
170 La. 345, 127 So. 746 (1930); Goule & Lambert v. Vidal, 15 La. 479 (1840).
Comment, supra note 2, at 409-10 n.17.
33. 369 So. 2d 1043 (La. 1979).
34. Id. at 1045 n.2.
35. Guidroz v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 334 So. 2d 535, 539 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1976). Generally, the first circuit is responsive to an application for writs, but not an
appeal. The Guidroz court expressed its "feel[ing] ... (that the] appropriate remedy ...
is either the application for supervisory writs or appeal after final judgment." Id. (Em-
phasis added.)
[Vol. 40
1980] WORK OF APPELLATE COURTS-1978-1979 767
reparable injury; others have concluded that, in some instances,
denial may cause irreparable injury. Among those courts which con-
cede that irreparable injury could result, there is division over the
test for determining when such an injury will result. The fourth cir-
cuit recently opined that the standard is whether any error may
practically be corrected by an appeal, following a determination on
the merits." In Hunter v. Health & Social & Rehabilitation Services
-Division of Health, Maintenance and Ambulatory Patients Ser-
vices," the second circuit observed that the test is not whether the
error may be corrected on appeal, but "whether the procedural er-
ror will have such an effect on the merits of the case that the ap-
pellate court cannot correct an erroneous decision on the merits." 8
Under either test, an order denying trial by jury will not cause ir-
reparable injury. If the case is tried to a judge after erroneous
denial of a jury trial, the matter will reach the appellate court after
final judgment with a complete record, from which the appellate
court can make the same review which it would have made from a
jury decision. Since the standard of review in jury and non-jury
trials is the same,39 the only difference is that the appellate court
has been deprived of a jury's initial view of the case.'" However, the
supreme court's opinon in Gonzales v. Xerox Corp." stands as a
declaration that the litigant's opportunity to have his case reviewed
after an appropriate jury verdict does not outweigh the cost of the
additional judicial resources which may be necessary to provide
such a procedure.'2 Balanced against this, of course, is the argument
that, in most cases, the right to a jury trial can be determined by
the appellate court summarily and from the face of the pleadings. In
such cases, the court, following the fourth circuit's lead in Mangin v.
Auter,'3 should control erroneous denial of jury trial through the use
of supervisory writs.
36. See Jacobs v. Jacobs, 365 So. 2d 25 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1978). But see First
Nat'l Bank of Commerce, New Orleans v. Miller, 328 So. 2d 383 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1976) (where the fourth circuit noted its "doubts" as to the applicability of an appeal
from an interlocutory order, absent a showing of irreparable injury).
37. 372 So. 2d 577 (La. App. 2d 1979).
38. Id at 579.
39. See, e.g., Gilliland v. Feibleman's, Inc., 161 La. 24, 108 So. 112 (1926); Burt v.
Burt, 160 La. 387, 107 So. 234 (1926); Moret v. New Orleans Rys. Co., 112 La. 863, 36
So. 759 (1904); Roux v. Attardo, 93 So. 2d 332 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1957). But see McGinn
v. New Orleans Ry. & Light Co., 118 La. 811, 43 So. 450 (1907).
40. See Comment, supra note 2, at 404-05.
41. 320 So. 2d 163 (La. 1975).
42. Id. at 166. The court stated that "[wihen the entire record is before the ap-
pellate court, remand for a new trial produces delay of the final outcome and conges-
tion of crowded dockets while adding little to the judicial determination process." Id.
43. 360 So. 2d 577 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1978).
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Prior to 1976 the appellate process often proved perilous to the
litigant unsuccessful in the trial court and to his attorney. After ob-
taining an order of appeal and posting a bond to secure payment of
appellate costs, the appellant was required to pay all of the costs of
the appeal on or three days prior to the return day." Since the
return day usually would be extended if the clerk had not completed
the transcript, the appellant's attorney was required to make con-
tinuous inquiry into the process of transcription. If he overlooked the
return day or extended return day, thereby failing to pay costs, and
the clerk completed the transcript but failed to lodge it with the ap-
pellate court-because of the appellant's failure to pay costs-the
appeal would usually be dismissed. The appellant was left with only
a malpractice remedy against his attorney, a hollow remedy as the
appellant, unable to prove that he would have won the appeal, could
not establish damages.
The matter was further complicated by the 1976 amendment45 to
article 2126 of the Code of Civil Procedure requiring the appellant
to pay the cost of the appeal in cash within twenty days after ob-
taining the order of appeal and posting bond. In 1977 the Louisiana
State Law Institute sponsored legislation"6 designed to eliminate the
perils and to make the appeal a simple, workable process. The
amendments eliminated the requirement of a bond for devolutive ap-
peal and provided that the appellant need not pay the costs until the
clerk has notified him in writing of the amount. Thus, since 1978"7
the steps necessary to prosecute a devolutive appeal are relatively
simple: appellant need only (1) obtain an order of appeal, 8 (2) pay the
costs of the appeal within twenty days after receiving written notice
from the clerk of the amount of the costs, 9 and (3) pay any addi-
tional costs within a similar period after notification that additional
costs are due.5" The appellant no longer has to worry about the
return day or the completion of the transcript; nor is he required to
post a bond. Another change5 effected by the 1977 legislation is
44. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 2126 (as it appeared prior to 1976 La. Acts, No. 708, § 2).
45. 1976 La. Acts, No. 708, § 2.
46. 1977 La. Acts, No. 198.
47. 1977 La. Acts, No. 198, § 5 provided that "[the effective date of this Act is
January 1, 1978; the provisions hereof shall apply to all appeals in which the order of
appeal is granted on or after the effective date hereof."
48. Article 2126 requires estimation of the cost of the preparation of the record on
appeal "immediately after the order of appeal has been granted." (Emphasis added.)
49. "Within twenty days of the mailing of notice, the appellant shall pay the
amount of the estimated costs to the clerk." LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 2126.
50. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 2126 states that "[i]f the payment of additional costs is
required, the appellant shall pay the amount of additional costs within twenty days of
the mailing of the notice."
51. 1977 La. Acts, No. 198.
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that, even if the appellant fails to comply with the simplified ap-
pellate procedure, he need not necessarily suffer the harsh penalty
of dismissal. In lieu of dismissal, a court is authorized to punish the
litigant or his attorney by imposition of a fine upon either, or both.2
This latter change was applied by the fourth circuit in Williams v.
Aetna Insurance Co.53 The plaintiff's suit had been dismissed on an
exception. 4 She obtained a timely order of appeal and furnished an
appeal bond, signed by her and her surety. The clerk sent notice of
the estimated costs, but the plaintiff's counsel did not pay the costs
within twenty days thereafter. Apparently relying upon prior law,
her attorney paid the costs on the return day originally set by the
trial court. The trial court then dismissed the appeal for failure to
comply with the provision of article 2126 of the Louisiana Code of
Civil Procedure requiring payment of costs within twenty days.55
In reversing the trial court's decision, the fourth circuit noted
that article 2126 eliminated mandatory dismissal as the only
available penalty when the costs are not timely paid." Additionally,
since the article permits imposition of a separate penalty upon the
attorney who is at fault, his fault can no longer reasonably be im-
puted to the appellant. Thus, in the instant case where the appellant
(1) was not at fault, (2) manifested an intent not to abandon the ap-
peal by executing the unnecessary bond, and (3) in fact paid the
costs before the filing of the motion to dismiss, dismissal of the ap-
peal was too extreme a penalty.
JURY TRIALS
Code of Civil Procedure article 1733(2) 57 provides that a jury
52. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 2126 provides:
If the appellant fails to pay the estimated costs, or the difference between
the estimated costs and the actual costs, within the time specified, the trial judge,
upon motion by the clerk or any party, and after hearing, may:
(1) Extend the time within which the costs may be paid, not to exceed thirty
days with or without penalty upon appellant or his attorney; or
(2) Impose a fine, not to exceed one hundred dollars, upon the appellant, or
his attorney, or both; or
(3) Dismiss the appeal.
53. 368 So. 2d 1252 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979).
54. Id. at 1253.
55. Id. at 1254.
56. Judge Lemmon wrote that "[slignificantly, the amended article [2126] also
eliminated mandatory dismissal as the only available penalty when costs were not paid
timely." Id. See Lemmon & Maraist, Simplifying Appellate Procedure, 25 LA. B.J. 193
(1977).
57. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 1733(2) provides that "[a] suit on an unconditional obliga-
tion to pay a specific sum of money, unless the defense thereto is forgery, fraud, error,
want or failure of consideration" is not an instance where a jury trial shall be
available.
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trial is not available in a suit on an unconditional obligation to pay a
specific sum of money, unless the defense is forgery, fraud, error, or
want or failure of consideration. If such a defense is urged, is the
litigant entitled to a jury trial only on that issue, or is he entitled to
trial by jury on the entire case? The second circuit, assuming
without deciding that a suit on a continuing guaranty is a suit on an
unconditional obligation to pay a specific sum of money, held that
where the defendant pleads one of the enumerated defenses, he is
entitled to trial by jury on all of the issues in the case. 8 The court
observed that the general rule is that a litigant is entitled to trial
by jury and that article 1733 sets forth exceptions to that general
rule; it then concluded that where the exceptions are inapplicable,
the parties are entitled to a jury trial of the whole case under the
general rule. 0
Procedural law normally requires that the plaintiff bear the
burden of producing evidence and that, if he fails to make out a
prima facie case in the initial presentation of his case in chief, the
suit should be dismissed and the trial ended. Prior to 1977, however,
Louisiana did not provide a mechanism for disposition of claims in
which the plaintiff failed to make out a prima facie case. The
peremptory exception urging no cause of action proved unsatisfac-
tory, as it is triable on the face of the pleadings." Summary judg-
ment also was inappropriate, both because it was triable on
documentary evidence and because it required ten days notice.2 The
Louisiana procedural code made no provision for a directed verdict
or a motion to dismiss, and the courts refused to supply one.
In 1977 the legislature added"8 article 1810 of the Code of Civil
58. Ruston State Bank & Trust Co. v. Theodus, 367 So. 2d 899 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1979).
59. Id. at 900.
60. Succinctly, the court concluded that "[djefendant is entitled to a trial by jury
of all issues." Id.
61. LA. CODE Civ. P. art 931 provides:
On the trial of the peremptory exception pleaded at or prior to the trial of
the case, evidence may be introduced to support any of the objections pleaded,
when the grounds thereof do not appear from the petition.
When the peremptory exception is pleaded in the trial court after the trial of
the case, but prior to a submission for a decision, the plaintiff may introduce
evidence in opposition thereto, but the defendant may introduce no evidence ex-
cept to rebut that offered by the plaintiff.
No evidence may be introduced at any time to support or controvert the ob-
jection that the petition fails to state a cause of action.
62. See LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 966.
63. '1977 La. Acts, No. 699, § 1, adding LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 1810.
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Procedure to provide for a directed verdict in civil jury trials." In
the following year, it amended 5 the article to add a similar
device-the motion to dismiss-in civil non-jury trials.6 While the
legislative effort was noteworthy, it failed to provide the standard
of proof by which the judge must decide whether to direct a verdict
or grant a motion to dismiss.
In the past term, the appellate courts began the task of for-
mulating the standard of review in directed verdicts. In Dupree v.
Pechinay Saint Gobain,7 the first circuit, evaluating the propriety of
a directed verdict below, wrote that where "[tihere was substantial
evidence, if believed by the jury, from which reasonable inferences
could be drawn by the jury in reaching a verdict against [the defen-
dant] . . . . the trial judge properly denied the motion . . .for a
directed verdict."
6 8
This rule seems to comport with the general common law stan-
dard and the test applied within the United States Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals. That standard, articulated in Boeing Co. v. Ship-
man,"6 is that the court should consider all of the evidence-not just
that evidence which supports the non-mover's case-but in the light
most favorable to the party opposed to the motion. If the facts and
inferences point so strongly and overwhelmingly in favor of one party
that the court believes that reasonable men could not arrive at a
contrary verdict, granting of the motion is proper. On the other
hand, if there is substantial evidence opposed to the motion, that is,
64. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 1810 (as it appeared prior to 1978 La. Acts, No. 156,
§ 1) provided:
A party who moves for a directed verdict at the close of the evidence offered
by an opponent may offer evidence in the event that the motion is not granted,
without having reserved the right so to do and to the same extent as if the
motion had not been made. A motion for a directed verdict which is not granted is
not a waiver of trial by jury even though all parties to the action have moved for
directed verdicts. A motion for a directed verdict shall state the specific grounds
therefor. The order of the court granting a motion for a directed verdict is effec-
tive without any assent of the jury.
65. 1978 La. Acts, No. 156, § 1.
66. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 1810 provides in relevant part:
In an action tried by the court without a jury, after the plaintiff has completed
the presentation of his evidence, any party, without waiving his right to offer
evidence in the event the motion is not granted, may move for a dismissal of the
action as to him on the ground that upon the facts and law, the plaintiff has
shown no right to relief. The court may then determine the facts and render judg-
ment against the plaintiff and in favor of the moving party or may decline to
render any judgment until the close of all the evidence.
67. 369 So. 2d 1075 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1979).
68. Id. at 1080.
69. 411 F.2d 365 (5th Cir. 1969).
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evidence of such quality and weight that reasonable and fair-minded
men in the exercise of impartial judgment might reach different con-
clusions, the motion should be denied and the case submitted to the
jury."0 In Campbell v. Mouton,7 the third circuit adopted the com-
mon law and fifth circuit test, quoting the. Boeing language."2
Adoption of the common law standard appears workable and
wise; it has stood the test of time in other jurisdictions and there is
a wealth of jurisprudence to aid the Louisiana courts in further
development. In applying the standard, the judge's thought process
should proceed in this fashion: (1) what are the primary facts, ie.,
the elements of plaintiff's cause of action; (2) is there direct evidence
to support each primary fact, ie., the testimony of a witness with
the opportunity for firsthand knowledge testifying as to the ex-
istence of such fact; or (3) is there testimony of witnesses, with the
opportunity for firsthand knowledge, as to the existence of cir-
cumstances from which a reasonable mind could infer the primary
facts? If there is direct evidence, or sufficient circumstantial
evidence, as to each primary fact, the motion for directed verdict
should be denied; if not, it should be granted.
PLEADINGS
May a plaintiff in a tort action recover general damages in ex-
cess of that which he has demanded in his pleadings? In Wexler v.
Martin,"5 a decision which could have significant impact in personal
injury litigation, the fourth circuit answered affirmatively. The pro-
cedural issue arose when the plaintiff, who had sought only $20,000
in general damages, moved during trial to amend his petition to in-
crease the demand for general damages. The trial court at first
refused, but subsequently permitted, amendment "to [c]onform with
the [e]vidence." ' The jury then awarded $41,000 in general
damages. On appeal, the court first noted that amendment of the
pleadings under Code of Civil Procedure article 1154 did not apply.
That article" permits amendment to reflect issues not raised by the
pleadings but tried by consent of the parties, or amendment to meet
the objection that evidence is not within the issues made by the
70. Id. at 374.
71. 373 So. 2d 237 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979).
72. Judge Stoker wrote that "since the source of... article 1810(A) is the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, we believe that the correct standard is that applied in the
Federal Courts." Id. at 239. See note 70, supra, and accompanying text.
73. 367 So. 2d 111 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979).
74. Id. at 113.
75. Id.
76. See text at note 89, infra.
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pleadings. Since evidence of general damages was admissible under
the pleadings, neither provision was applicable. However, the court
concluded that amendment was unnecessary. Judge Lemmon first
noted that the Code of Civil Procedure requires specific allegations
of special damages, but that it is silent on the issue of pleading
general damages. He then observed that article 8628 permits final
judgment to exceed in amount that which is demanded in the peti-
tion, unless judgment is by default."' He concluded that the
plaintiffs petition was not defective and that the plaintiff was not
bound by the amount of general damages for which he prayed. 0
The decision, if followed, could herald the end of the itemization
of general damages and the abuse which has accompanied it. Such
itemization has limited utility in the administration of justice. In
contested cases, lawyers and judges ignore it. Moreover, the amount
demanded is usually so great that few litigants will forego defense
because of the "ceiling" which a plaintiff has placed in his demand.
The abuses are many, however. Demand for exorbitant sums in the
pleadings may mislead jurors when reference to general damages is
permitted in voir dire or argument. Equally important, claims for
great amounts of damages can have an in terrorem effect upon the
individual defendant, particularly where the amount demanded ex-
ceeds his insurance coverage. On balance, the policy decision ap-
pears wise and the codal interpretation to reach the result appears
proper.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
In support of its motion for summary judgment on the basis that
the plaintiff in a tort action was its "statutory employee" whose
recovery was limited to workmen's compensation benefits, the
defendant filed an affidavit stating that the affiant was "district pro-
duction manager," that the facility at which plaintiff was injured
was within the affiant's district, and that he was therefore compe-
tent to testify to the facts contained in the affidavit and knew those
77. 367 So. 2d at 114.
78. LA. CODE CiV. P. art. 862 provides:
[E]xcept as provided in Article 1703, a final judgment shall grant the relief to
which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not
demanded such relief in his pleadings and the latter contain no prayer for general
and equitable relief.
79. Judge Lemmon wrote that through Code of Civil Procedure article 862 the
legislature "provide[d] that the amount of demand is only relevant to default judg-
ments." 367 So. 2d at 114.
80. l
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facts of his "own personal knowledge." '81 The supreme court held in
Barnes v. Sun Oil Co.82 that this affidavit was not sufficient to sup-
port a grant or denial of summary judgment because it failed to
"'show affirmatively' that the affiant was competent to testify to the
matters stated therein."" The court found that these allegations
were mere conclusions. The court reasoned that article 967 of the
Code of Civil Procedure requires that the affidavit contain facts
which show that the affiant has the requisite personal knowledge,
not mere conclusions that he has such knowledge.
The court's decision is merely a common sense application of
basic evidentiary principles to summary judgment. Before a witness
may testify to facts relevant to the issues in the lawsuit, there must
be evidence that he has firsthand knowledge of those facts. 5 Or-
dinarily, the foundation is laid through questioning which indicates
that the witness was in a position to perceive the facts regarding his
testimony. Testimony that he is aware of the facts is not a sufficient
81. Barnes v. Sun Oil Co., 362 So. 2d 761, 763 (La. 1978).
82. 362 So. 2d 761 (La. 1978).
83. Id. at 763.
84. Justice Dennis wrote that "[a]ffidavits supporting or opposing motions for
summary judgment must be made on personal knowledge, set forth such facts as
would be admissible in evidence, and show affirmatively that the affiant is competent
to testify to the matters stated therein." Id.
LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 967 provides:
Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall
set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirma-
tively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn
or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be
attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be sup-
plemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or by further
affidavits.
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided
above, an adverse party may not rest on the mere allegations or denials of his
pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided above, must set
forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not
so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be rendered against him.
If it appears from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that for
reasons stated he cannot present by affidavit facts essential to justify his opposi-
tion, the court may refuse the application for judgment or may order a continu-
ance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to
be had or may make such other order as is just.
If it appears to the satisfaction of the court at any time that any of the affi-
davits presented pursuant to this article are presented in bad faith or solely for
the purposes of delay, the court immediately shall order the party employing
them to pay to the other party the amount of the reasonable expenses which the
filing of the affidavits caused him to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees.
Any offending party or attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt.
85. See C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 10 (E. Cleary ed.
1972); 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 650-70 (3d ed. 1940).
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foundation;" he must state facts which demonstrate that he could
have perceived that about which he will testify. 7 Summary judg-
ment is a substitute for trial in which the testimony is submitted
through affidavit rather than personal appearance." Accordingly,
the allegations of the affidavit should contain those facts which the
witness would be required to state if he were testifying in person.
Thus, the court's decision appears logical. In preparation of af-
fidavits for use in summary judgment, attorneys should follow the
form for eliciting the witness' testimony at trial; in so doing, they
necessarily would comply with the Barnes ruling.
AMENDMENT OF PLEADINGS
Article 1154 of the Code of Civil Procedure, permitting amend-
ment of pleadings during the course of a trial, envisions two distinct
situations, one in which a party fails to object to inadmissible
evidence and the other in which he does. If he fails to object, he has
impliedly consented to trial of the issue raised by the evidence. In
such case, article 1154 provides that
[s]uch amendment of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause
[the pleadings] to conform to the evidence and to raise these
issues may be made upon motion of any party at any time, even
after judgment; but failure to so amend does not affect the
result of the trial of these issues.8
86. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 85.
87. The burden of laying a foundation by showing that the witness had an ade-
quate opportunity to observe is upon the party offering the testimony. By failing
to object the adversary waives the preliminary proof, but not the substance of the
requirement, so that if it later appears that the witness lacked opportunity, or did
not actually observe the fact, his testimony will be stricken.
Id.
88. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 966 provides:
The plaintiff or defendant in the principal or any incidental action, with or
without supporting affidavits, may move for a summary judgment in his favor for
all or part of the relief for which he has prayed. The plaintiff's motion may be
made at any time after the answer has been filed. The defendant's motion may be
made at any time.
The motion for summary judgment shall be served at least ten days before the
time specified for the hearing. The adverse party may serve opposing affidavits
prior to the day of the hearing. The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith
if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to
material fact, and that mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
With respect to summary proceedings, FED. R. Civ. P. 56 states that
[t]he judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, deposi-
tions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affi-
davits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
89. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 1154.
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Where a party timely objects to proferred inadmissible testimony,
he does not consent to trial of the issues raised by the evidence."
The court ordinarily will sustain the objection, and the party offer-
ing the evidence will seek to amend orally to raise the issues which
would permit introduction of the excluded testimony. In such cases
"the court may allow the pleadings to be amended and shall do so
freely when the presentation of the merits of the action will be
subserved thereby."'" However, unlike the first situation, in which
the opponent failed to object, article 1154 does not relieve the pro-
ponent who is permitted to amend orally during the course of the
trial from subsequently preparing and filing a written amendment.
This distinction was pointed out by the first circuit in Industrial
Sand & Abrasives v. Quebedeaux." There the court reasoned that,
since article 852"1 requires that all pleadings be in writing and since
article 1154 does not relieve the proponent of the inadmissible
evidence of this burden when the evidence is admitted through oral
amendment over the opponent's objection, evidence admitted pur-
suant to such amendment cannot be considered by the court if a
written amendment is not subsequently made.'
CLASS ACTIONS
The evolution of the class action in Louisiana procedure has
been swift and perhaps is now complete. The final stage was reached
in the last term in the decision in the celebrated "engine switch"
case, State v. General Motors Corp." The Attorney General brought
a class action on behalf of the 1,467 Louisiana purchasers of
automobiles in which the manufacturer allegedly substituted engines
from another make of automobile." Since the members of the class
were adequately represented and were sufficiently numerous to
make joinder impracticable, maintenance of the class action hinged
upon whether "the character of the right sought to be enforced for
90. Obviously, a timely objection to an opponent's proffered inadmissible testi-
mony destroys any notion of actual or implied consent. However, Louisiana law "is
well settled that the pleadings may be enlarged by evidence adduced without objec-
tion, which is not pertinent to any of the issues raised by the pleadings, and hence
would have been excluded if objected to timely." LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 1154, comment
(b).
91. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 1154.
92. 366 So. 2d 999 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1978).
93. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 852 provides that "[t]he pleadings allowed in civil ac-
tions, whether in a principal or incidental action, shall be in writing." (Emphasis
added.)
94. 366 So. 2d at 1000.
95. 370 So. 2d 477 (La. 1979).
96. The Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law, LA. R.S. 51:1401-18
(Supp. 1972), prohibits a private litigant from maintaining a class action for actual
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or against the members of the class [was] common to all members of
the class."97 As with many other procedural devices, the Code of
Civil Procedure does not afford assistance in determining when the
claims of the members of the "class" are sufficiently related to per-
mit utilization of the class action. Recently, the supreme court has
interpreted" the relevant articles" in such a manner as to equate
the Louisiana class action with the liberal class action provided by
rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.' In the
General Motors case, the Louisiana court perhaps has gone beyond
anything contemplated by the federal or state rulemakers.
In Stephens v. Board of Trustees of Police Pension Fund,"1' the
court found sufficient "commonality" when the claims shared ques-
tions of law or fact and when joinder in a single action would com-
port with the policies of judicial efficiency, fairness to the parties,
and implementation of substantive policy. 102 The class action in
Stevens met those criteria. It was an action by former municipal
policemen to recover mandatory contributions to a retirement
system. Williams v. State,"3 subsequently decided, represented an
extension of the class action. In that case over 600 inmates at the
state penitentiary allegedly sustained food poisoning from a single
damages. Under section 1407, the Attorney General may bring suit for injunctive
relief. Section 1408 then provides that "[t]he court may . . . render judgments against
any party, as may be necessary to compensate any aggrieved person for any prop-
erty . . . which may have been acquired from such person by means of any [unlawful]
method, act or practice .... " The fourth circuit in General Motors held that, although
the Attorney General may be prohibited from bringing a class action for damages on
behalf of the aggrieved purchasers, he could maintain an action for restitution or
diminution as a part of his enforcement authority. However, his right to maintain the
class action also was dependent upon meeting the requirements of articles 591-97 of
the Code of Civil Procedure. 354 So. 2d 770 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1978).
97. 370 So. 2d at 479.
98. See, e.g., Stevens v. Board of Trustees of Police Pension Fund, 309 So. 2d 144
(La. 1975).
99. LA. CODE Civ. P. arts. 591-92. See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate
Courts for the 1977-1978 Term-Civil Procedure, 39 LA. L. REV. 903, 907 (1979).
100. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) provides for class action when
the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the
class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that
a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient
adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include: (A)
the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or
defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning
the controversy already commenced by or against members of the class; (C) the
desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the
particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management
of a class action.
101. 309 So. 2d 144 (La. 1975).
102. Id. at 147 & 149.
103. 350 So. 2d 131 (La. 1977).
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meal;104 the supreme court held that the class action should have
been certified.0 5
In Stevens the claims of the parties hinged on a single set of
facts and a single issue of liability, and determination of monetary
recovery by a member of the class would not necessarily require
evidence different from that necessary to establish the monetary
recovery of another.106 In Williams the facts bearing upon the defen-
dant's liability to persons sustaining injury were identical, and the
concentration of facts and witnesses in one place-the state peniten-
tiary-supported the argument that judicial efficiency could be at-
tained through the use of the class action device. 7 Similarly, since
many of the injured claimants would be at a disadvantage in present-
ing their claims, due to the size of the claims and the claimants' in-
carceration, the other goals of the class action could be met by per-
mitting its use.1" The use of the class action in the General Motors
case is more difficult to defend. Unlike Stevens and Williams, the
claims of the General Motors class members did not necessarily
hinge upon a single set of facts. The terms and conditions of each
purchase could depend upon what was understood by the seller and
the purchaser in their negotiations. The amount of the claims, the
difference in factual patterns, the possibility of additional defen-
dants (the automobile dealers) who did not share common liability to
all plaintiffs, and the demand for a jury trial indicate that the mat-
ter would be an unwieldly one for a class action. If a class action
such as that before the court in the General Motors case is to be
certified, a more prudent action would appear to be a certification of
the class action only as to a particular issue, ie., the liability vel non
of the manufacturer for the engine "switch."'' The remaining issues,
including the liability of the dealer and the amount of damages, if
any, could be determined in separate suits.
104. Id. at 133.
105. Id, at 139.
106. 309 So. 2d at 150-51.
107. 350 So. 2d at 133-34.
108. Id. at 135.
109. The federal rule, FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4), permits a class action "with respect
to particular issues." A similar authorization for a Louisiana court may be inferred
from articles 191, 193, and 1561 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Furthermore, language
in William8 supports the notion that a class action may be maintained with regard to
certain issues, but not others, arising from the same cause of action. Justice Tate
wrote that
the Louisiana courts are constitutionally authorized to issue all writs, orders and
process in aid of their constitutional or legislative jurisdiction. La. Const. of 1974,
Art. 5, Section 2. See also LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 191: "A court possesses inherently all
of the power necessary for the exercise of its jurisdiction even though not granted
expressly by law."
350 So. 2d at 138.
[Vol. 40
